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A commentary on
When the world becomes ‘too real’:
a Bayesian explanation of autistic
perception
by Pellicano, E., and Burr, D. (2012). Trends
Cogn. Sci. 16, 504–510.
In a recent opinion article, Pellicano
and Burr (2012) speculate about how a
Bayesian architecture might explain many
features of autism ranging from stereo-
typical movement to atypical phenomeno-
logical experience. We share the view of
other commentators on this paper (Brock,
2012; Friston et al., 2013; Van Boxtel and
Lu, 2013) that applying computational
methods to psychiatric disorders is valu-
able (Montague et al., 2012). However, we
argue that in this instance there are funda-
mental technical and conceptual problems
which must be addressed if such a perspec-
tive is to become useful.
Based on the Bayesian observer model
(Figure 1), Pellicano and Burr speculate
that perceptual abnormalities in autism
can be explained by differences in how
beliefs about the world are formed, or
combined with sensory information, and
that sensory processing itself is unaffected
(although, confusingly, they also speak of
sensory atypicalities in autism). In compu-
tational terms, the authors are suggesting
that the likelihood function is unaltered
in autism and that the posterior is atyp-
ical either because of differences in the
prior, or because of the way in which
prior and likelihood are combined. The
latter statement is problematic because
within the framework of probability the-
ory, the combination of these two com-
ponents is fixed as determined by Bayes’
theorem: they are multiplied. Put sim-
ply, a mathematically consistent Bayesian
model cannot accommodate a perceptual
abnormality in autism that is due to the
way in which belief and sensory informa-
tion, i.e., prior and likelihood, are com-
bined. Furthermore, if sensory processing
is mathematically represented as a like-
lihood function (as it typically is within
Bayesian models), then changes in the
prior cannot lead to changes in sensation,
as the authors claim (they can only lead to
changes in perception).
A second problem is the lack of jus-
tification for the view that autistic atypi-
calities in perception exclusively relate to
differences in the prior. Typically, Bayesian
models start with three unknowns—prior,
likelihood, and cost function—and atypi-
calities might therefore be due to any of
these components (also see Brock, 2012).
This pertains to both the family of dis-
tributions or functions, which these com-
ponents come from, and their specific
parameter values. Given this flexibility of
Bayesian models, meaningful results can
only be obtained if the uncertainty about
the three unknowns is theoretically or
empirically constrained in a principled
manner.
Third, the center piece of Pellicano and
Burr’s proposal, emphasized in the title
and the abstract, is the assertion that due
to a “broadening” of the prior, autistic
perception is more accurate in the sense
that it is closer to physical reality. We
believe that this idea is fundamentally mis-
guided and deserves immediate attention
because it turns not only Bayesian mod-
eling of perception but Bayesian statistics
as a whole on its head. Taken to its logical
extreme, the authors’ claim is that per-
ception unrefined by prior beliefs about
the world is the best assessor of reality.
However, the reason why Bayesian statis-
tics have been so generally successful is
that combining knowledge of the statisti-
cal regularities of the world in the form of
a prior with a noisy measurement provides
a more accurate estimate of the veridi-
cal value than solely relying on measure-
ment (Chernoff and Lincoln, 1959; Berger,
1985; Young and Smith, 2005). This is
why Bayesian statistics were adopted in
modeling of perception; they offer an opti-
mal solution to exactly the problem that
any perceptual system faces—inferring the
hidden causes of its sensory measurements
under uncertainty (Geisler and Kersten,
2002)—and can therefore serve as a bench-
mark. Only if the knowledge represented
in the prior systematically differs from the
statistics of the current situation, does its
incorporation result in a less accurate (or
less “real”) perceptual system. Within the
Bayesian framework, this is how illusions
are explained because observers apply
natural-image statistics to an artificial lab-
oratory situation (Weiss et al., 2002). Yet,
exactly the same priors providemore accu-
racy in the natural world than would
measurement alone. Put differently, under
those circumstances for which the prior
has developed—perception under natu-
ralistic circumstances—, a “hypo-prior”
would do the opposite to what the authors
claim, namely, it would lead to less accu-
rate perception. Illusions thus do not illus-
trate that priors per se render perception
less accurate; rather, it is the application of
the wrong prior that leads to the illusory
percept.
While one might envisage that
“broader” priors lead to a perception that
is closer to sensory input, this does not
mean that the observer would perceive the
world as more “real.” In order to regulate
its interactions with the environment, an
observer needs appropriate information
about the states of the world. Yet, there is
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FIGURE 1 | The standard Bayesian observer model (Geisler and Kersten,
2002) embodies the assumption that perception is based on two
sources of information: prior beliefs about the state of the world are
updated by incoming sensory information; perceptual decisions are
then based on the updated beliefs. For the purpose of modeling, the
psychological concepts of belief, sensory processing, perception, and
decision are mapped onto mathematical concepts derived from probability
theory: respectively, these are the prior, the likelihood function, the posterior,
and the cost function. Specifically, the observer’s belief about the statistical
regularities of the world is modeled by a probability distribution (the prior);
the observer’s noisy sensory processing is reflected in a measurement
distribution, which specifies a likelihood function; the combination of prior
and likelihood according to Bayes’ theorem models the combination of belief
and sensory information; this results in an a posteriori probability distribution
(the posterior), representing the space on which the perceptual decision is
made. One value picked from the domain of this distribution according to an
implicit decision rule, determined by gains and losses specified in a cost
function, represents the ultimate percept of the observer.
no direct access to this information but
only to sensory stimulation caused by the
environment. This poses a computational
problem because sensory information is
noisy and inherently ambiguous. On its
own, it rarely suffices to uniquely specify
the environment. The Bayesian frame-
work provides an optimal solution to this
challenge by resorting to an additional
source of information—prior knowledge
of the world’s regularities—that allows
disambiguation of the incoming sensory
information. Put simply, a perceptual sys-
tem that refines sensory information by
prior knowledge provides a better estimate
of real but hidden causes than percep-
tion that is based on the ambiguous
sensory information on its own because
the former system exploits all the relevant
information available.
Pellicano and Burr list a large num-
ber of phenomena that, they argue, can be
explained by weaker priors in autistic indi-
viduals. It is therefore not surprising that
some of these examples such as impaired
performance on some perceptual tasks are,
at least theoretically, consistent with a
Bayesian framework. The possible consis-
tency, however, would not rectify the prob-
lems that, we believe, attend the central
conceptual tenet of the paper. Moreover, it
is noteworthy that some of the examples
are vulnerable to empirical criticism. The
primary phenomenon that the authors cite
in support of their hypothesis—a reduced
susceptibility in autism to some illusions
(Happé, 1996)—has not been replicated
more recently (Hoy et al., 2004; Mitchell
and Ropar, 2004; Milne and Scope, 2008;
Simmons et al., 2009). This issue seems
to pose a critical challenge to the general
claims expressed in the article.
We agree that Bayesian models pro-
vide a principled way of thinking about
visual perception in autism. However,
much work remains to be done in pro-
viding full mathematical formalizations of
specific, isolated symptoms. Once such
data are available for a range of abnor-
malities, it will be useful to revisit
the challenge of providing an overarch-
ing computational architecture of autistic
perception.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This work was funded by the Wellcome
Trust and the Bernard Wolfe Health
Neuroscience Fund.
REFERENCES
Berger, J. O. (1985). Statistical Decision Theory and
Bayesian Analysis. New York, NY: Springer.
Brock, J. (2012). Alternative Bayesian accounts of
autistic perception: comment on Pellicano and
Burr. Trends Cogn. Sci. 16, 573–574.
Chernoff, H., and Lincoln, E. M. (1959). Elementary
Decision Theory. New York, NY: John Wiley and
Sons.
Friston, K. J., Lawson, R., and Frith, C. D. (2013).
On hyperpriors and hypopriors: comment on
Pellicano and Burr. Trends Cogn. Sci. 17, 1.
Geisler, W. S., and Kersten, D. (2002). Illusions, per-
ception and Bayes. Nat. Neurosci. 5, 508–510.
Happé, F. G. E. (1996). Studying weak central coher-
ence at low levels: children with autism do not suc-
cumb to visual illusions. A research note. J. Child
Psychol. Psychiatry 37, 873–877.
Hoy, J. A., Hatton, C., and Hare, D. (2004). Weak
central coherence: a cross-domain phenomenon
specific to autism? Autism 8, 267–281.
Milne, E., and Scope, A. (2008). Are children with
autistic spectrum disorders susceptible to contour
illusions? Br. J. Dev. Psychol. 26, 91–102.
Mitchell, P., and Ropar, D. (2004). Visuo-spatial abil-
ities in autism: a review. Infant Child Dev. 13,
185–198.
Montague, P. R., Dolan, R. J., Friston, K. J., and Dayan,
P. (2012). Computational psychiatry. Trends Cogn.
Sci. 16, 72–80.
Pellicano, E., and Burr, D. (2012). When the
world becomes ‘too real’: a Bayesian explana-
tion of autistic perception. Trends Cogn. Sci. 16,
504–510.
Simmons, D. R., Robertson, A. E., McKay, L. S.,
Toal, E., McAleer, P., and Pollick, F. E. (2009).
Vision in autism spectrum disorders. Vision Res.
49, 2705–2739.
Van Boxtel, J. J. A., and Lu, H. (2013). A predictive
coding perspective on autism spectrum disorders:
a General Comment on Pellicano and Burr (2012).
Front. Psychol. 4:19. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00019
Weiss, Y., Simoncelli, E. P., and Adelson, E. H.
(2002). Motion illusions as optimal percepts. Nat.
Neurosci. 5, 598–604.
Young, G. A., and Smith, R. L. (2005). Essentials of
Statistical Inference. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press.
Received: 19 February 2013; accepted: 15 March 2013;
published online: 03 April 2013.
Citation: Teufel C, Subramaniam N and Fletcher PC
(2013) The role of priors in Bayesian models of per-
ception. Front. Comput. Neurosci. 7:25. doi: 10.3389/
fncom.2013.00025
Copyright © 2013 Teufel, Subramaniam and Fletcher.
This is an open-access article distributed under the terms
of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which
permits use, distribution and reproduction in other
forums, provided the original authors and source are
credited and subject to any copyright notices concerning
any third-party graphics etc.
Frontiers in Computational Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org April 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 25 | 2
